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Disagreements within the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have deepened as new revelations emerged about the military’s handling of intelligence and its response to Hamas’s unprecedented attack on October 7, 2023.
Key details have surfaced, pointing to potential miscommunications and missed opportunities within the Air Force, IDF Operations Command, and Intelligence Command, raising questions about their readiness and response to the invasion.
According to a report by Walla’s Amir Bohbot, later confirmed by the Jerusalem Post, senior officials within the IDF, including Shlomi Binder, the former senior official in the IDF Operations Command, who was promoted to head the IDF Intelligence Command in August 2024, had knowledge of Hamas’s plans before the attack.
Binder passed on some warnings to a top aide to Air Force Chief Maj. Gen. Tomer Bar in the critical hours before the invasion.
Despite this, significant gaps in communication remain a central issue, as it appears some key individuals within the military were unaware of the growing threat until it was too late.
At 6:36 a.m., just minutes after the Hamas attack began at 6:29 a.m., IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Herzi Halevi called Bar to notify him of the unfolding situation.
This phone call took place roughly seven minutes after the first rockets were launched, signaling the start of what would become one of the most significant military operations in recent Israeli history.
Adding to the confusion, Bohbot’s report disclosed that Halevi’s top aide sent a message at 7:05 a.m. to high-ranking officials within the IDF, including the air force, confirming that the war had started.
Despite these communications, critical decisions about deploying the Air Force were delayed, raising questions about the overall coordination among the military’s various branches.
Earlier reports from Yediot Ahronot also indicated that the Air Force had intelligence suggesting a large rocket attack was imminent, as Hamas launched a barrage of about 3,000 rockets in the early hours of the morning.
Yet, even with these warnings, it appears the Air Force’s immediate response was insufficient to stem the wave of attacks.
The revelations present a stark contrast to earlier explanations given by the Air Force, which initially claimed that it had insufficient information to mobilize its top fighter jets to defend the border.
Instead, the Air Force deployed drones and helicopters, leaving many to wonder whether a stronger response could have limited the scale of the attack.
Reports confirm that within two hours of the attack, dozens of Air Force platforms were in operation, but the decision to prioritize other missions, such as protecting critical infrastructure, over defending the border has raised concerns.
While some of the Air Force’s top aircraft were deployed for infrastructure protection, others argue that they should have been immediately redirected to assist in stopping Hamas’s land invasion.
The Air Force’s narrative until now has centered around the claim that it lacked sufficient real-time information to understand the magnitude of the invasion.
However, the latest revelations suggest that the Air Force had been given considerable intelligence that, in hindsight, could have led to a faster and more decisive response.
While the Air Force’s senior leadership, including Maj. Gen. Tomer Bar, has been criticized for its delayed response, the emerging picture complicates this narrative.
According to military sources, it appears that despite receiving multiple updates about the unfolding situation, Bar and other Air Force leaders failed to act swiftly, continuing with default protocols rather than adjusting to the rapidly evolving threat on the ground.
A key moment of confusion was the phone call between Halevi and Bar. Sources familiar with the matter claim that the brief conversation did not convey the urgency of the situation.
The text message sent at 7:05 a.m. by Halevi’s aide, while signaling the start of the war, was not seen by all IDF officials as a call to immediately mobilize forces for a large-scale military operation.
The latest information brings increased attention to Shlomi Binder, who has become a focal point of the ongoing debate.
Binder, who was recently promoted to head the IDF Intelligence Command, has found himself at the center of military decisions that critics claim were influenced by unclear or misinterpreted intelligence.
Sources close to Binder have emphasized that he was simply following orders from his superiors to pass on warnings, and it wasn’t until much later in the day that the scale of Hamas’s attack became fully apparent to military leaders.
As political figures in Israel look to reform the IDF leadership, some have targeted Binder for his proximity to Lt.-Gen. Halevi, whose resignation is set for March 2024.
Critics argue that Binder’s rise within the military ranks reflects a continuation of Halevi’s leadership, which they believe should be replaced with officials who are perceived as more politically aligned with the government.
However, supporters of Binder stress that his actions were guided by the information available at the time, and any delays in the Air Force’s response were part of a larger, systemic failure within the military’s structure.
The situation has raised broader questions about the IDF’s intelligence-sharing and decision-making processes, particularly in moments of crisis.
Despite receiving multiple intelligence updates, including details about Hamas’s rocket units and the nature of the invasion, it appears that critical decisions were delayed or mishandled, resulting in a response that was less coordinated than it should have been.
As the dust settles from the events of October 7, the IDF faces mounting pressure to address these internal disputes and learn from its shortcomings.
The continued investigation into the handling of the invasion has made it clear that the failure to act swiftly and decisively could have cost lives and contributed to the scale of the destruction wrought by Hamas.
The military’s focus now is on assessing the strategic and operational failures of that fateful day.
This includes reevaluating the decision-making processes at all levels, particularly the communication and coordination between the IDF’s Operations Command, Intelligence Command, and the Air Force.
The ongoing debate over whether the Air Force was adequately informed or whether it could have acted differently will likely continue as the IDF seeks to adapt to the challenges of modern warfare.
As Israel moves forward from the events of October 7, the political ramifications of these disputes are becoming more pronounced.
With the resignation of Lt.-Gen. Halevi in the coming months, the focus will shift to the future leadership of the IDF and whether reforms can be implemented to prevent such failures in the future.
For now, the unfolding drama within the IDF serves as a sobering reminder of the complexities involved in modern military operations and the high stakes of decision-making in the face of existential threats.